Nothing Succeeds Like Success

The embrace of liberal political reform by approximately 100 diferent states in the third wave of democratization of the 1990s was taken as a marker of the universal appeal of liberal society. The argument was made that the world-wide extinction of Leninist regimes, together will liberalization even among non-Leninist authoritarian states, indicated a world historical drift towards a liberal, capitalist order. Further, this was less the result of historical contingency but rather the expression of natural human aspirations, finally freed from external repression. the world wide embrace of democratic-liberal language and political programs were accepted as evidence of the universal appeal of applicability of liberal politics. Rejecting the Cold War perspective of pessimism based on theories of preconditions (economic, social, cultural) for democratic politics and society, contemporary observers instead claimed that no preconditions were necessary. Societal embrace for democratic values (at both the elite and mass level, through pacts and mass movements) was sufficient and the great expense of the third wave democratization demonstrated how broad the potential support and appeal could be. Every where human baby), being human, favored democracy and everywhere democracy could succeed. The third wave was both the greatest flowering of liberal politics and the great vindication of liberal political sensibilities.

However, this mistakes the source of the appeal of liberal politics. The liberal states of the West are not only remarkable for the extent of individual freedom that their inhabitants enjoy, but also for their high material standard of living, economic achievements and international prestige. This complicates any argument for the universal appeal of liberal politics base on the experience of the third wave -are foreign publics responding to the moral and ethical appeal of the system, or is it the material prosperity of power of the West which inspires emulation? Nothing succeeds like success, and the power and prosperity of the West are great enough to provoke a certain level of admiration and envy from poorer societies. However, such an appeal is purely a result of economic and power considerations, not a election of a universal valves consensus or convergence. From such a perspective, liberal reforms are simply a tool - the secret of the West's success, desirable only for the sake of the tangible benefits that are associated with them. Political institutions are patterned along Western lines in the belief that such reforms will bring the benefits of development, and the legitimacy of those new institutions then takes on a developmentalist cast. For from representing the end of history, the Third War can also be thought of as merely the latest in a series of asp rational emulations by less developed countries seeking to somehow reproduce the elements of material success found in more advanced model countries. This has occurred before -in the late 19th century, the ascendance of Western powers triggered a wave of developmentalist emulation abroad - it was in this period that Japan and China replicated Western forms of government, and the Balkan states began a series of liberalizing, parliamentary reforms. However, much more damning is the interwar period - at the nadir of liberal prestige worldwide, the model for emulation become fascist Italy, with its promise of a nationalist path to successful, independent modernity. With few exceptions, the states of Central and Eastern Europe embraced variants of this ideology, eschewing any pretence to a liberal orientation. Fascism likewise found an ease reception outside of the West, including in sophisticated and relatively prosperous Japan. Ever in the post-war period, with the defeat of the fascist powers, Marxism provided a compelling alternative to liberal-style development, inspiring dozers of Communist revolutions and socialist followed states. All of this begs the question - what is the motivation of those societies which embarked on reform in the third wave? Was it the expression of long-repressed universal values, or principally and attempt to capture the material prosperity and development visible in the West?

This is a far from insignificant question - if liberal values are indeed universal values, then the prospects for successful liberalization are somewhat insulated from pragmatic concerns. Disappointing economic progress or traditional administrative disorder should not fatally undermine the appeal of liberal reforms. lf, on the other hand the principal source of the chrisma of liberalism lies in its developmentalist promise, and the legitimacy of liberal orders in their ability to deliver on that promise, then we can expect impatience and disillusionment to he normal reactions to the frustration of developmental expectations.